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OPINION
                                  
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
This appeal by Feesers, Inc. (“Feesers”), a food distributor,
arises out of a Robinson-Patman Act claim for unlawful price
discrimination, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (the “RPA”), against Michael Foods,
  Sodexho, Inc. changed its name to Sodexo, Inc. during1
the course of this litigation.  We will refer to the company by its
new name.
  Section 2(a) of the RPA, in relevant part, states that:2
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce, in the course of such commerce, either
directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price
between different purchasers of commodities of
like grade and quality, where either or any of the
purchases involved in such discrimination are in
commerce, where such commodities are sold for
use, consumption, or resale within the United
States or any Territory thereof or the District of
Columbia or any insular possession or other place
under the jurisdiction of the United States, and
where the effect of such discrimination may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to
5
Inc. (“Michaels”), a food manufacturer, and Sodexo, Inc. (“Sodexo”),1
a food service management company.  Feesers claims that Sodexo was
able to purchase egg and potato products from Michaels at a
discounted price that was unavailable to Feesers.  Following a bench
trial, the District Court entered judgment for Feesers.  We will vacate
that judgment and instruct the District Court to enter judgment as a
matter of law for Michaels and Sodexo.  Feesers and Sodexo were not
competing purchasers, and, therefore, Feesers cannot satisfy the
competitive injury requirement of a prima facie case of price
discrimination under § 2(a) of the RPA.   In doing so,2
injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any
person who either grants or knowingly receives
the benefit of such discrimination, or with
customers of either of them: Provided, That
nothing herein contained shall prevent
differentials which make only due allowance for
differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or
delivery resulting from the differing methods or
quantities in which such commodities are to such
purchasers sold or delivered[.] . . . .  And provided
further, That nothing herein contained shall
prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares,
or merchandise in commerce from selecting their
own customers in bona fide transactions and not
in restraint of trade: And provided further, That
nothing herein contained shall prevent price
changes from time to time where in response to
changing conditions affecting the market for or
the marketability of the goods concerned, such as
but not limited to actual or imminent deterioration
of perishable goods, obsolescence of seasonal
goods, distress sales under court process, or sales
in good faith in discontinuance of business in the
goods concerned.
15 U.S.C. § 13(a).
6
we hold that, in a secondary-line price discrimination case, parties
competing in a bid market cannot be competing purchasers where the
competition for sales to prospective customers occurs before the sale
of the product for which the RPA violation is alleged. 
  Three of the four requirements of a § 2(a) Robinson-3
Patman claim have already been established by Feesers and are
not contested in this appeal.  Feesers, Inc., 498 F.3d at 208.
Feesers has shown “that sales were made to two different
purchasers[, Feesers and Sodexo,] in interstate commerce; that
the product sold was of the same grade and quality; and that
[Michaels] discriminated in price as between the two
purchasers.”  Id. at 211.  What remains for resolution by this
Court is the fourth requirement, a showing “that the
discrimination had a prohibited effect on competition.”  Id. at
212. 
7
When reviewing a judgment entered after a bench trial, we
exercise “plenary review over [the] [D]istrict [C]ourt’s conclusions of
law” and its “choice and interpretation of legal precepts.”  Am. Soc’y
for Testing & Materials v. Corrpro Cos., 478 F.3d 557, 566 (3d Cir.
2007) (internal quotations omitted).  Findings of fact are reviewed for
clear error.  Id.  The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over
this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we exercise appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
Michaels and Sodexo raise a host of issues in this appeal, but
in light of this Court’s decision in Toledo Mack Sales & Service, Inc.
v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2008), and the Supreme
Court’s decision in Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco
GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164 (2006), we need address only the issue of
whether Sodexo and Feesers were “competing purchasers” for
purposes of the RPA.  Feesers, Inc. v. Michael Foods, Inc., 498 F.3d
206, 213 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Falls City Indus. v. Vanco Beverage,
460 U.S. 428, 435 (1983)).3
8I.
The following facts were found by the District Court after a
bench trial.  Feesers, Inc. v. Michael Foods, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 414,
418 (M.D. Pa. 2009).
Structure of the Food Service Industry
The food service industry consists of a three-tier distribution
system: manufacturers sell products to distributors, who resell those
products to operators, including self-operators (“self-ops”) and food
service management companies.  Id. at 420-21.  Self-ops are
institutions that perform all dining services internally.  Food service
management companies perform institutions’ dining services for a fee,
id., and primarily target schools, hospitals, and nursing homes.
Sometimes operators negotiate with manufacturers for discounted
prices, known as “deviated prices.”  Id. at 432.  In those instances, the
distributor purchases the product at list price from the manufacturer,
sells the product to the operator at the deviated price, and receives the
difference between the list price and the deviated price from the
manufacturer.  Id.  An operator may also seek discounts from
manufacturers by joining a Group Purchasing Organization (“GPO”).
A GPO is a collection of operators who negotiate food prices
collectively to achieve greater bargaining power against manufacturers
and distributors.  Id. at 421.  “GPOs generally bargain for a lower
price, but do not actually purchase the food for resale to institutions.”
Id.
The Parties in this Appeal
9Michaels is a manufacturer of egg and potato products that sells
in bulk, nationwide.  Id.  It is the largest producer of liquid eggs in the
United States.  Id.  Feesers is a regional distributor that distributes
Michaels’s products, and others, to operators within a 200-mile radius
of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.  Id.  Sodexo is a multinational food
service management company that serves institutions around the
world.  Id.  Its services include planning menus, ordering food,
preparing and serving meals, and overseeing labor issues.  It is the
largest private purchaser of food in the world.  Id.  Sodexo owns
Entegra, a GPO.  Id. at 427.
Michaels’s Pricing of Food Products
Michaels sells sixty percent of its products at deviated prices.
Id. at 432.  It has offered deviated pricing to self-ops since the mid-
1990s and to food service management companies, like Sodexo, since
at least 1999.  “[O]n average from 2000 until 2004, Feesers paid
$9.56, or 59% more than [Sodexo] for [Michaels’s] eleven top selling
products.”  Id. at 434.  This pricing difference was described as
“stunning” by Feesers’s expert witness.  Id.  The deviated pricing
Sodexo received from Michaels was not institution-specific, so Sodexo
could “use its low deviated price . . . to win new accounts and to keep
current customers.”  Id. at 432.
Competition between Feesers and Sodexo
Feesers sells food to self-op institutions and food service
  The District Court found that Feesers sold only to self-op4
institutions, Feesers, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 421-22.  This
finding was clearly erroneous.  The District Court’s own fact
finding describing Feesers’s business explains that Feesers
distributed food for Wood, a food service management
company.  Compare id. (“Feesers only sells food to self-op
institutions[.]”), with id. at 421 n.3 (“Feesers was the primary
distributor for the Wood Company,” a food service management
company.).
  The Jewish Home of Greater Harrisburg and St. Mary’s5
Catholic School both switched from Feesers to Sodexo.
Feesers, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 422.  The Meadows switched
from Sodexo to Feesers.  Id.
10
management companies.   Id. at 421-22.  Sodexo sells food in4
conjunction with its food service management services.  Id. at 422.
Institutional customers “regularly switch [between] self-op [and]
management,” and at least three institutions have switched between
Feesers and Sodexo.  Id.   Both companies regularly seek self-op5
business.  Id.  Feesers tries to distribute for self-ops while Sodexo tries
to convert self-ops to food service management.
When a self-op switches to Sodexo, it relies on Sodexo to
handle all dining services functions, such as procurement and
distribution of food.  Id.  Sodexo itself is not a distributor, but it
decides which distributors its customers will use.  Id.  Thus, when an
institution switches from self-op to Sodexo, the incumbent distributor
who distributed for the self-op may be replaced.  Id.  Because Feesers
could be displaced by Sodexo’s chosen distributor if Sodexo wins a
self-op’s business, the two companies compete “when a customer
considers switching from self-op to food service management, or vice
  We regard this inferred fact as highly questionable, but6
the finding does not rise to the level of clear error.  In our view,
assuming that Sodexo replaced Feesers with another distributor,
Feesers’s competitor would be the other distributor, not Sodexo.
  Food service management companies compete with7
each other through a formal RFP process to win institutions’
business.  Feesers, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 428.  The RFP
process is usually limited to food service management
companies.  Id.
  The District Court also identified other evidence8
showing competition between Feesers and Sodexo, including
Sodexo’s SEC filings, Feesers, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 422, and
its internal strategic documents, id. at 423.  None of this
11
versa.”  Id. at 430.   Accordingly, Feesers and Sodexo “compete[d] for6
the same portion of an institution’s food service budget.”  Id. at 420.
Competition between Feesers and Sodexo occurred informally
prior to the request for proposal (“RFP”) process ordinarily required
by large institutions.   Id. at 428.  To grow its client base, Sodexo 7
identifies institutions that meet its client profile and then builds
relationships with those institutions.  Id. at 428-29.  During informal
contacts with a prospective institutional customer, Sodexo “gauges the
institution’s interest in management and determines whether there are
any particular problems to be solved.”  Id. at 428.  If the institution is
interested in management, it will then put out a RFP and Sodexo will
follow through in that process.  Id.  Aside from seeking new clients,
Sodexo also touts its access to discounted foods to its existing
customers that utilize it for preparation and ordering of food, but not
for distribution.  Id. at 429.  This is done, in part, to encourage those
customers to switch to Sodexo’s chosen distributor.  Id.8
evidence stated that Sodexo regarded any distributor as a
competitor.  Id. at 422-23 (noting that Sodexo’s SEC filings
identified lower overall costs of food service management as a
means of promoting itself over self operation); id. at 425
(“Sodex[o]’s strategic planning documents do not specifically
mention distributors as competitors[.]”).
  We reversed in a 2-1 decision.  The dissent concluded9
that Sodexo and Feesers were not in actual competition because
they “d[id] not sell the same products.”  Feesers, Inc., 498 F.3d
at 220 (Jordan, J., dissenting).  In reaching that conclusion, the
dissent explained that Feesers “res[old] . . . unprepared foods to
its institutional clients,” whereas Sodexo “prepare[d] meals, and
12
Procedural History
On March 17, 2004, Feesers sought a declaratory judgment
stating that (1) Michaels unlawfully discriminated in price under § 2(a)
of the RPA by selling egg and potato products to Sodexo at
significantly lower prices than it did to Feesers and (2) Sodexo
violated § 2(f) of the RPA by knowingly inducing those discriminatory
sales.  15 U.S.C. § 13(a) and (f).  Feesers also sought permanent
injunctive relief under § 16 of the Clayton Act.  15 U.S.C. § 26.  On
May 4, 2006, the District Court granted summary judgment for the
defendants, concluding that Feesers had satisfied the first three
elements of a prima facie case of price discrimination, but not the
fourth element, competitive injury.  “The District Court was concerned
that [Sodexo] and Feesers [we]re not at the same ‘functional level’ and
[we]re therefore not in ‘actual competition’ in the same market.”
Feesers, Inc., 498 F.3d  at 214. 
Feesers appealed and this Court reversed.   We held that the9
s[old] the prepared meals to individual customers.”  Id. at 218.
(Jordan, J., dissenting).  The majority disagreed, noting that “a
factfinder could conclude that Sodex[o] s[old] unprepared food
to its customers” because some of Sodexo’s agreements with
institutional clients did not charge for “‘prepared meals,’ but
rather for the cost of unprepared food and supplies, the cost of
labor, and a management fee.”  Id. at 215.
  The prior decision is explained in Section IV(A), infra.10
13
District Court had applied the wrong standard in concluding that
Feesers and Sodexo were not in competition.  Id. at 208.  The panel
explained the proper standard and remanded the case to the District
Court for further proceedings.10
On remand, after a bench trial, the District Court entered
judgment for Feesers and enjoined Michaels from engaging in
unlawful price discrimination.  Michaels then suspended all sales to
Feesers.  In response, Feesers sought an order of contempt and a
permanent injunction forbidding Michaels from refusing to deal with
Feesers.  On May 26, 2009, the District Court held Michaels in
contempt and enjoined it from refusing to “sell its products to Feesers
on the same terms as they are sold to [Sodexo], so long as Feesers
otherwise meets its standards as a customer.”  Michaels and Sodexo
now appeal the District Court’s judgment and the permanent
injunction.
II.
“‘Competitive injury’ [under § 2(a) of the RPA] is established
. . . by proof of ‘a substantial price discrimination between competing
purchasers over time.’”  Feesers, Inc., 498 F.3d at 213 (quoting Falls
  Because Feesers cannot satisfy the first element11
required to show competitive injury, we need not discuss
14
City Indus., 460 U.S. at 435) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
“Feesers does not need to prove that [Michaels’s] price discrimination
actually harmed competition, i.e., that the discriminatory pricing
caused Feesers to lose customers to Sodex[o].  Rather, Feesers need
prove only that (a) it competed with Sodex[o] to sell food and (b)
[that] there was price discrimination over time by [Michaels].”
Feesers, Inc., 498 F.3d at 213 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in
original).  
To determine whether Feesers competed with Sodexo to sell
food, “the relevant question is whether [the] two companies ‘[we]re in
economic reality acting on the same distribution level.’”  Id. at 214
(quoting Stelwagon Mfg. Co. v. Tarmac Roofing Sys., Inc., 63 F.3d
1267, 1272 (3d Cir. 1995)).  Recognizing that the phrase “economic
reality” provides little guidance in how to approach the competition
inquiry, this Court, in the prior appeal in this case, explained that two
parties are in competition only where, after a “careful analysis of each
party’s customers,” we determine that the parties are “each directly
after the same dollar.”  Feesers, Inc., 498 F.3d at 214 (quoting M.C.
Mfg. Co. v. Tex. Foundries, Inc., 517 F.2d 1059, 1068 n.20 (5th Cir.
1975)).  We refer to this dollar-for-dollar analysis as the competing
purchaser requirement.  The Supreme Court’s guidance in Volvo
Trucks, 546 U.S. at 179-80, and this Court’s precedent in Toledo
Mack, 530 F.3d at 226-29, compel us to conclude that Feesers and
Sodexo were not competing purchasers.  Thus, Feesers cannot satisfy
the first element required to show competitive injury, and its RPA
claims must fail as a matter of law.11
whether it experienced price discrimination over time.
15
A.
In application, the competing purchaser requirement will vary
based on the nature of the market and the timing of the competition.
In a bid market, if the competition between the favored and disfavored
purchaser occurs before the purchase of the goods from the seller, then
the disfavored purchaser cannot show that it and the favored purchaser
were competing purchasers.  Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 178-79.  This
rule prevents the application of the RPA to markets where the
“allegedly favored purchasers [bear] little resemblance to [the] large
independent department stores or chain operations” that the RPA was
intended to target, id. at 181, and helps “construe the [RPA]
‘consistently with the broader policies of the antitrust laws,’” id.
(quoting Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209, 220 (1993)).  
In practice, the rule, like other restrictions on the reach of the
RPA, prevents the unprincipled application of the statute.  Indeed,
because the RPA often has “anticompetitive” effects that “promote
rather than . . . prevent monopolistic pricing practices,” Small Business
and the Robinson-Patman Act: Hearings before the Special
Subcommittee on Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act of the
House Select Committee on Small Business, 91st Cong. 146-47 (1969)
(testimony of Richard A. Posner), the Supreme Court, in seeking to
construe the statute consistently with the broader policies of the
antitrust laws, has repeatedly limited its reach by: 
• Expanding the means through which RPA defendants
  Accord Falls City Indus., 460 U.S. at 451-52 (vacating12
judgment that defendant did not have a meeting competition
16
can attack the “competition” element of a prima facie
case of price discrimination, Texaco v. Hasbrouck, 496
U.S. 543, 561 (1990) (“A supplier need not satisfy the
rigorous requirements of the cost justification defense in
order to prove that a particular functional discount is
reasonable and accordingly did not cause any substantial
lessening of competition between a wholesaler’s
customers and the supplier’s direct customers.”)
(footnote omitted);
• Focusing the competition inquiry on “interbrand
competition,” Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 180;
• Explaining that the RPA does not “ban all price
differences charged to different purchasers of
commodities of like grade and quality,” id. at 176
(quoting Brooke Group Ltd., 509 U.S. at 220);
• “[R]esist[ing] interpretation[s] [of the RPA] geared
more to the protection of existing competitors than to
the stimulation of competition,” Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S.
at 181 (emphasis omitted); and,
• “[R]ecogni[zing] [that] the right of a seller to meet a
lower competitive price in good faith may be the
primary means of reconciling the [RPA] with the more
general purposes of the antitrust laws,” Great Atl. &
Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69, 82 n.16 (1979)
(interpreting RPA to provide robust meeting
competition defense).   12
defense); Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory
State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 487 (1989) (“Courts should
narrowly construe statutes that serve no plausible public
purpose, and amount merely to interest-group transfers . . . .
Th[is] idea helps explain a number of decisions in areas of
economic regulation, such as . . . the courts’ approach to the
Robinson-Patman Act.”) (citing Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust
Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 409-10 (1978)).
17
This Court has dutifully followed the Supreme Court’s lead by
narrowly construing the RPA.  In Toledo Mack, we explained that we
will “narrowly interpret” the RPA, even if doing so will result in
“elevat[ing] form over substance.”  Toledo Mack, 530 F.3d at 228
n.17. 
While the competing purchaser requirement has its roots in FTC
v. Morton Salt, 334 U.S. 37, 46-51 (1948), the most recent decisions
discussing that requirement are Volvo Trucks and Toledo Mack.  Both
decisions emphasized that proving “substantial price discrimination
between competing purchasers over time,” Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at
179 (quoting Falls City Indus., 460 U.S. at 435) (emphasis omitted),
requires accounting for the timing of the alleged competition and the
nature of the market.  Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 178-79; see Toledo
Mack, 530 F.3d at 228.
In Volvo Trucks, the Supreme Court rejected an inference of
competitive injury where the plaintiff, Reeder-Simco (“Reeder”),
could not show that it was a competing purchaser.  Volvo Trucks, 546
U.S. at 179-80.  Reeder was a Volvo dealer who competed with other
dealers (both Volvo brand and others) through a customer-specific
bidding process for sales to individuals seeking custom-built trucks.
18
Id. at 169.  Reeder alleged that Volvo sold trucks to other Volvo
dealers at unlawfully discriminatory prices, giving those other dealers
an unfair advantage in selling to prospective customers.  The
customer-specific bidding process began with the customer stating its
specifications and inviting bids from dealers it had selected.  Id. at
170.  The selected dealers would submit bids to the customer and the
dealer that won the bid would arrange for the manufacturer, in this
case, Volvo, to build the truck for the customer.  Id.  Like the deviated
pricing system of food manufacturers, it was common for truck
manufacturers to offer “customer-specific discounts to their dealers.”
Id.  Prior to submitting a bid to a customer, a Volvo dealer would ask
Volvo if it could get a discount for the customer.  Id.  Volvo would
then decide on a case-by-case basis what discount it would grant a
particular customer based on factors like industry-wide demand and
whether the customer had previously purchased from Volvo.  Id.
While the discount varied based on many factors, the dealers always
knew what discounts they could offer a customer before submitting
their bids to the customer.  See id.
The specific question presented in the case was whether “a
manufacturer offering its dealers different wholesale prices may be
held liable for price discriminations proscribed by Robinson-Patman,
absent a showing that the manufacturer discriminated between dealers
contemporaneously competing to resell to the same retail customer.”
Id. at 169.  In deciding that question in the negative, the Supreme
Court concluded that Reeder could not establish an inference of
competitive injury based on the timing of the competition between the
dealers and the nature of the market, Reeder’s evidence of competitive
injury, and the goals of the RPA.
  The first type, evidence of head-to-head comparisons13
between Reeder and other Volvo dealers, is not relevant in the
instant case.  Reeder’s evidence showed only “two instances
over [a] five year course” where it bid against other Volvo
dealers, so called head-to-head comparisons: One instance
where it and another Volvo dealer received the same discount
and Reeder lost to the other dealer because the customer had
19
The timing of the competition between the dealers and the
nature of the market were critical to the Supreme Court’s reasoning.
At the initial stage of competition in the bid market, where dealers
were competing to win the right to submit a bid to a customer,
“competition [wa]s not affected by differential pricing [because] a
dealer in the competitive bidding process approach[ed] Volvo for a
price concession . . . only after it ha[d] been selected by a retail
customer to submit a bid.”  Id. at 178-79.  Prospective customers chose
which dealers could submit bids based on a variety of factors
“including the existence vel non of a relationship between the potential
bidder and the [prospective] customer, geography, and reputation.”  Id.
at 179.  After the prospective customer chose who could submit bids,
the relevant market narrowed to the few dealers who were chosen:
“Once a retail customer has chosen the particular dealers from which
it will solicit bids, ‘the relevant market becomes limited to the needs
and demands of a particular end user, with only a handful of dealers
competing for the ultimate sale.’”  Id. (quoting Reeder-Simco GMC,
Inc. v. Volvo GM Heavy Truck Corp., 374 F.3d 701, 719 (8th Cir.
2004) (Hansen, J., dissenting)).
The Supreme Court was also unimpressed with Reeder’s
evidence purporting to show competitive injury.  Reeder produced
three types of evidence to support its allegations.   The two types of13
previously bought from the other dealer, and one instance where
it and the opposing Volvo dealer received matching discounts
from Volvo and neither won the bid.  Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at
172.  On this evidence, the Supreme Court noted that Reeder
showed the “loss of only one sale” and that “Reeder and the
other dealer received the same concession” in that instance.  Id.
at 180.  In the other instance of head-to-head competition, both
Volvo dealers received the same concession and neither won the
bid.  Id.  The Supreme Court concluded that “if price
discrimination between two purchasers existed at all, [a sale that
would have resulted in $30,000 more in gross profits for
Reeder] was not of such magnitude as to affect substantially
competition between Reeder and the ‘favored’ Volvo dealer.”
Id.   
  Notably, in this case, Feesers produced evidence14
showing that Michaels consistently favored Sodexo.  Feesers,
Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 434.  This type of evidence was not
20
evidence relevant to the instant case were Reeder’s “comparisons of
[discounts] [it] received for four successful bids against non-Volvo
dealers, with larger [discounts] other successful Volvo dealers
received for different sales on which [it] did not bid (purchase-to-
purchase comparisons),” Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 177 (emphasis in
original), and “comparisons of [discounts] offered to [it] in connection
with several unsuccessful bids against non-Volvo dealers, with greater
concessions accorded other Volvo dealers who competed successfully
for different sales on which [it] did not bid (offer-to-purchase
comparisons),” id. at 177-78 (emphasis in original).  These two types
of evidence did not create an inference of competitive injury because
(1) the alleged price discrimination did not occur for the same
customer and (2) Reeder did not attempt to show that other Volvo
dealers were consistently favored.  Id. at 178.14
produced in Volvo Trucks, so the Supreme Court never
explained whether both or only one of its reasons for rejecting
the inference of competitive injury need be rectified in order to
infer competitive injury.  546 U.S. at 179 n.3.  As we later
explain, this Court, in Toledo Mack, rejected the argument that
evidence showing that a certain purchaser was consistently
favored was sufficient to infer competitive injury in a bid market
where the competition occurred prior to the actual sale.  Toledo
Mack, 530 F.3d at 228-29.
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The Supreme Court also signaled that it was uninterested in
permitting innovative applications of the RPA and would resist
“interpretation[s] geared more to the protection of existing competitors
than to the stimulation of competition.”  Id. at 181 (emphasis in
original).  It also noted that the custom truck market bore “little
resemblance to [the] large independent department stores or chain
operations” that the RPA originally intended to target.  Id. 
This Court used similar reasoning in Toledo Mack.  530 F.3d at
226-29.  That case had facts similar to Volvo Trucks—Toledo, a Mack
truck dealer, would submit bids to prospective customers who wished
to purchase customized Mack trucks.  Id. at 209.  In creating a bid,
Toledo would seek out a “transaction-specific discount [from Mack]
known as ‘sales assistance.’”  Id.  “The amount of sales assistance
[Mack offered] varie[d] according to the nature of the relationship
between the dealer and the customer, the number of trucks ordered,
potential competition, and other factors.”  Id.  Toledo sued Mack under
the RPA, claiming that it consistently received less sales assistance
than other Mack dealers.
In affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment for
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the defendant, Mack, on the RPA claim, this Court explained that the
timing of competition and the nature of the market are critical factors
to consider when determining whether the plaintiff can show that it
was a competing purchaser of a favored purchaser.  We concluded that
because the competition between Mack dealers occurred during the
bidding process, and not at the time of the actual sale, Toledo could
not satisfy the competing purchaser requirement or the two purchaser
requirement:
Because no sale takes place until a customer accepts a
dealer’s bid, the amount of sales assistance Mack is
willing to provide to a particular dealer is part of an
offer by Mack to sell, not a sale.  Regardless of any
competition between the dealers during the bidding
process, only a dealer whose bid is accepted by a
customer will actually buy a truck from Mack.
Therefore, only one sale, not two, actually results.
Id. at 228. 
Toledo, unlike the plaintiff in Volvo Trucks, did not offer
evidence of head-to-head competition between it and other Mack
dealers.  Id. at 215.  But it did provide expert testimony regarding “the
average amounts of sales assistance Mack offered to Toledo as
compared with the average amount of sales assistance Mack offered
to other [Mack] dealers,” i.e., evidence showing that Mack
consistently favored other dealers as compared to Toledo.  Id.  That
evidence was rejected by this Court as irrelevant because even if the
“amount of sales assistance Mack offer[ed] to each dealer . . .
determine[d] whether a customer cho[se] to accept a bid from one
Mack dealer or another, Mack does not sell a truck to the dealer until
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the customer actually selects a dealer’s bid.”  Id. at 228.  Thus, only
one sale, not two, resulted from the competition.  Id.  This was true in
part because the sale was divorced from the competition and Toledo
could not show that it was a competing purchaser vis-à-vis other Mack
dealers.  See id.
Finally, the Toledo Mack Court noted that, like Volvo Trucks,
“the alleged price discrimination d[id] not implicate the original
purpose of the RPA because ‘the allegedly favored purchasers [we]re
dealers with little resemblance to large independent department stores
or chain operations.’”  Id. at 227 (quoting Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at
181).
B.
While this Court’s conclusion in Toledo Mack undoubtedly
turned on the fact that “one sale, not two, actually result[ed],” Toledo
Mack, 530 F.3d at 228, it was not reached by a simple application of
the RPA’s two purchaser requirement.  It was reached through the
combined effect of the RPA’s two purchaser and competitive injury
requirements—i.e., the competing purchaser requirement.  Id.; see
Falls City Indus., 460 U.S. at 435 (explaining competing purchaser
requirement); Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 179 (same).  
In Toledo Mack we held that because the competition among
dealers for prospective customer business occurred before the
purchase of the truck to be sold to the customer by the winning dealer,
the relevant market for the sale to the customer was already limited to
one at the time the manufacturer sold the dealer the truck.  See Toledo
Mack, 530 F.3d at 228.  Because the relevant market was only one
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dealer making one purchase from the manufacturer for resale to one
customer, the two purchaser requirement could not be satisfied.  See
id.  Thus, this Court rejected Toledo’s RPA claim for lack of two
purchasers, which was based on the lack of a competitive market, i.e.
the lack of a competing purchaser.  See id.  This conclusion comports
with M.C. Mfg., 517 F.2d at 1065, the decision relied upon by this
Court in Toledo Mack, 530 F.3d at 228, and in this Court’s prior
decision in this case, Feesers, Inc., 498 F.3d at 214 (instructing the
District Court to apply the Fifth Circuit’s test to “determine whether
Sodex[o] and Feesers compete to resell food products to the same
group of customers”) (citing M.C. Mfg. Co., 517 F.2d at 1068 n.20).
In addition, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Volvo Trucks further
confirms our understanding of the competing purchaser requirement.
In M.C. Mfg., two companies, Universal and H/R, manufactured
lifting plugs for sales to the government.  M.C. Mfg., 517 F.2d at 1061.
Both companies purchased “unfinished plug castings” from Texas
Foundries and those castings were used to create the lifting plugs.  Id.
Both companies would purchase castings after they had won a contract
with the government.  Id. at 1067.  In its complaint, Universal alleged
that H/R and Texas Foundries violated the RPA because (1) Texas
Foundries quoted a lower price to H/R than Universal for their
respective bids for a government contract and H/R won that contract
(the “1971 Contract”), id. at 1061-62, 1066-67, and (2) Texas
Foundries sold unfinished plug castings to Universal at a higher price
in a separate contract (the “1970 Contract Extension”).  Id. at 1065-66.
Universal argued that the prices it received in the 1970 Contract
Extension were unlawfully discriminatory as compared to the prices
H/R received in the 1971 Contract.  In doing so, Universal’s
allegations appeared to satisfy the two purchaser requirement because
  See M.C. Mfg., 517 F.2d at 1066 (“Even if the sales at15
different prices are contemporaneous, involve goods of like
grade and quality, the price distinction is not justified by good
business cause, and it causes injury to the disadvantage[d]
purchaser, recovery under the Act is precluded absent proof that
the price variance detrimentally affected competition.”).
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the two companies were both purchasing the same type of unfinished
plug casting from Texas Foundries.  This appearance, however, was
misleading because the contracts from which Universal’s purported
injuries flowed were distinct markets open only to a single producer.
See id. at 1067.  H/R and Universal were not competing purchasers
because the 1970 Contract Extension and the 1971 Contract each
“represented a separate, distinct market open only to a single
producer.”  Id.  “The very nature of th[o]se mutually exclusive
commitments in the respective contracts meant that Universal and H/R
could not have been ‘in competition’ with respect to their separate
purchases from Texas Foundries pursuant to the government
contracts.”  Id.  “Therefore, while the price discrepancy between
[Texas Foundries’s sales to H/R under the 1971 Contract and to
Universal under the 1970 Contract Extension] could have affected
Universal’s profits under the [1970 Contract Extension], this
discrimination in no way diminished Universal’s competitive ability
in that plug market.”  Id.  Thus, even though “Universal and H/R were
competitive bidders on the 1971 [C]ontract[, t]hey could not be . . .
competitive purchasers as required by the Act either under their
respective separate contracts or under both.”  Id.15
Similar reasoning was also invoked in Volvo Trucks.  546 U.S.
at 178.  There, the Supreme Court discounted the purchase-to-purchase
and offer-to-purchase evidence offered by Reeder in part because that
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evidence did not show that Reeder competed “with beneficiaries of the
alleged discrimination for the same customer.”  Id.  (emphasis in
original).  “That Volvo dealers may bid for sales in the same
geographic area” was of no import to the Supreme Court because that
fact was not relevant to whether two dealers “compet[ed] for the same
customer-tailored sales.”  Id. at 179.  “Once a retail customer has
chosen the particular dealers from which it will solicit bids, ‘the
relevant market becomes limited to the needs and demands of a
particular end user, with only a handful of dealers competing for the
ultimate sale.’”  Id. (quoting Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 374 F.3d at 719
(Hansen, J., dissenting)).
Accordingly, we reject the argument that Toledo Mack was a
simple application of the two purchaser requirement.  Implicit in the
Toledo Mack Court’s holding was the conclusion that Toledo could not
show it was a competing purchaser of other Mack truck dealers.  In
other words, the two purchaser requirement could not be satisfied
because the relevant market of competition was limited to one dealer,
one customer, and one truck manufacturer at the time of the sale of the
truck, i.e., there were no competing purchasers.  Toledo Mack, 530
F.3d at 228.
C.
Applying the teachings of Volvo Trucks and Toledo Mack to the
instant case, it is clear that Feesers never experienced a competitive
injury from Sodexo’s purchases and sales of Michaels’s products
because Feesers and Sodexo were not competing purchasers.  See
Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 179.  The competition between Feesers and
Sodexo for institutions’ business occurred prior to Michaels’s sales of
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food products to Feesers and Sodexo, “when a customer consider[ed]
switching from self-op to food service management, or vice versa.”
Feesers, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 430.  At that time, Sodexo would not
yet have secured any products from Michaels for resale to the
prospective customer because the customer would only be deciding
whether it wished to begin the RFP process or, if it had already chosen
to engage in the RFP process, whether to invite Sodexo to participate
in that process.  Once the customer has chosen whether to self-operate
or contract with a food service management company, “the relevant
market becomes limited to the needs and demands of a particular end
user, with only a handful of [distributors or food service management
companies] competing for the ultimate sale.”  Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S.
at 179; Toledo Mack, 530 F.3d at 228.  Thus, Feesers and Sodexo’s
competition at that early stage was irrelevant to the sales made by
Michaels after that competition was complete.  If an institution chose
to self-operate, Sodexo would be eliminated from the competition, and
if an institution chose to contract with a food service management
company, Feesers would be eliminated from the competition.  After
making that initial decision, the customer then has to choose which
distributor or food service management company it will hire.  Only
after that process is complete would the customer then actually
purchase food from Michaels through the winning distributor or food
service management company.
At all events, assuming Feesers and Sodexo engaged in head-to-
head competition, and the discounts granted by Michaels to the two
companies determined from which company an institution would
purchase Michaels’s products, the competing purchaser requirement
would still not be satisfied because Michaels does not make a sale until
the institution chooses a particular distributor or food service
  The discount schemes in Volvo Trucks and Toledo16
Mack were largely indistinguishable from the deviated pricing
system used in the food manufacturer industry.  See Toledo
Mack, 530 F.3d at 209-10 (explaining that requests for sales
assistance to Mack occurred prior to submission of bid to
customer); Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 170-71 (same).  Food
service management companies, self-ops, and GPOs, like the
truck dealers in Toledo Mack and Volvo Trucks dealing with
manufacturers, availed themselves of deviated pricing
arrangements with food manufacturers.  In general, these entities
know the discount they will receive before they purchase
products from manufacturers.  Food service management
companies can adjust their bid to a prospective customer to
incorporate these deviated pricing arrangements.
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management company and then begins purchasing Michaels’s products
through that company.  See Toledo Mack, 530 F.3d at 228.  The
relevant market at the time of the sale of Michaels’s products will have
already been narrowed to one—the company that won the institution’s
business.  See id.
While the timing of the competition and the nature of the
market compel us to conclude that Feesers and Sodexo were not
competing purchasers, it is also relevant that the evidence produced by
Feesers was the same type of average discount evidence produced in
Toledo Mack.   Compare Toledo Mack, 530 F.3d at 215 (plaintiff16
producing evidence comparing “the average amount of sales
assistance” received by the plaintiff as compared to other Mack truck
dealers), with Feesers, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 434 (plaintiff producing
evidence showing that Sodexo consistently received “stunning” price
discounts that amounted to a 59% difference in prices between Feesers
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and Sodexo over four years).  The Toledo Mack Court rejected such
evidence as insufficient to prove injury to competition in part because
“merely offering lower prices to a customer does not give rise to a
price discrimination claim.”  Toledo Mack, 530 F.3d at 227-28 (citing
Crossroads Cogeneration Corp. v. Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc.,
159 F.3d 129, 142 (3d Cir. 1998)).  A plaintiff must also show that the
effect of the lower prices was to injure competition.  Toledo Mack, 530
F.3d at 228 (citing Crossroads Cogeneration Corp., 159 F.3d at 142);
Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 181.  Yet that showing is impossible where,
as here, the case involves sales via a bidding process and the
competition occurs before the bidding process even begins.  See
Toledo Mack, 546 U.S. at 228.
In addition, the Supreme Court’s directive to narrowly construe
the RPA to address the basic purposes of the statute further informs
our conclusion that Feesers was not a competing purchaser of Sodexo.
Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 180-81; see Toledo Mack, 530 F.3d at 227.
The price discrimination identified by Feesers bears “little
resemblance to [the] large independent department stores and chain
operations” the statute was originally intended to target.  Toledo Mack,
530 F.3d at 227 (quoting Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 181).  Here, like
in Volvo Trucks, there is a myriad of differences between retail stores
and food service management companies and food distributors.
First, in many respects, Sodexo and Feesers do not compete.
Sodexo prepares and sells meals and handles all dining service
functions for its customers. Feesers only distributes food.  Competing
retail stores, in contrast, generally compete to sell fungible goods to
the same group of customers.  Second, Sodexo operates in a bid
market with other food service management companies, and competes
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with Feesers only in a preliminary stage where a prospective customer
is deciding whether to self-operate or hire a food service management
company.  Retail stores compete over prospective customers every
time a customer decides to purchase a product, and those purchases are
not made in a bid market.  Third, Sodexo competes for customers with
Feesers prior to purchasing food from Michaels.  Retail stores
generally purchase products from manufacturers and then compete
with other retailers based on pricing.  
In sum, because any competition between Feesers and Sodexo
occurred at the time an institution was deciding whether to self-operate
or hire a food service management company, and any resulting sale of
Michaels’s products would have to occur after that competition,
Feesers cannot show that it was a competing purchaser of Sodexo.
The evidence produced by Feesers only further confirms the futility of
its RPA claims, because such evidence—evidence showing consistent
favoring of another purchaser over the plaintiff over time by a
manufacturer in a bid market—was rejected in Toledo Mack.  Such
evidence cannot support an inference of competitive injury in a bid
market.  Finally, the Supreme Court’s instructions to narrowly
construe the RPA also compel us to reject Feesers’s RPA claims.
III.
The District Court, after thoughtful consideration of the Volvo
Trucks and Toledo Mack decisions, determined that those decisions
were not controlling for three reasons: (1) Volvo Trucks involved only
formal competition whereas the instant case involves formal and
informal competition; (2) application of Toledo Mack to the instant
case would misconstrue that decision’s holding by imposing a new
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requirement under the RPA, divorced from the statutory text, that the
manufacturer’s sale of the commodity to two different sellers occur
prior to the competition for the resale of those goods; and (3) a logical
reading of Toledo Mack limits that decision’s applicability to custom-
manufactured goods.  We reject each of these reasons in turn.
The District Court reasoned that because “[f]ood service
management companies, distributors, and GPOs all compete formally
and informally for the sale of food to institutions,” the instant case was
distinguishable from Volvo Trucks, which it believed involved only a
formal bidding process.  Feesers, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 431.
Contrary to the District Court’s belief, the market in Volvo Trucks
involved both formal and informal competition.  In that case, a
customer’s decision to request a bid from a particular dealer was based
on informal competitive factors such as “an existing relationship, . . .
reputation, and cold calling or other marketing strategies initiated by
individual dealers.”  Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 170 (internal quotation
omitted) (emphasis added).  Sodexo’s actions were indistinguishable
from the actions of truck dealers in Volvo Trucks.  Sodexo competed
for institutions’ business through the formal RFP process, and through
“informal contacts with targeted institutions.”  Feesers, Inc., 632 F.
Supp. 2d at 428.
The District Court’s second reason, that construing Toledo
Mack to apply to the instant case would require imposing a new
requirement under the RPA that the sale of the commodity by the
manufacturer to two different sellers occur prior to the competition for
resale of those goods, is a misunderstanding of the competing
  That being said, the District Court’s desire to avoid17
misapplying our precedent in this complicated area of law is
commendable.  Indeed, this is not the first time the RPA has
flummoxed the federal courts, nor, barring a repeal of the law,
will it be the last.  Compare, e.g., Van Dyk Research Corp. v.
Xerox Corp., 631 F.2d 251, 255 n.2 (3d Cir. 1980) (asserting in
dicta that failure to prove the “fact of injury” can conclusively
bar injunctive relief) (citing Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler
Corp., 569 F.2d 666, 668 n.2, 670 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1977)), with
Feesers, Inc., 498 F.3d at 213 (explaining that plaintiff need not
prove actual harm to competition to receive injunctive relief)
(citing Falls City Indus., 460 U.S. at 435).  The RPA places the
federal courts in an inescapable Catch-22.  We are asked to
apply the RPA, a statute that “is fundamentally inconsistent with
the antitrust laws,” Antitrust Modernization Commission,
Report and Recommendations 312 (2007), in a fashion that is
“consistent[] with the broader policies of the antitrust laws.”
Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 181 (quoting Brooke Group, 509 U.S.
at 220).  This conundrum is bound to create confusion for judges
called upon to apply the RPA in a host of settings.
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purchaser requirement.   The rule the District Court describes is not17
new—it is simply the product of the competing purchaser requirement,
which considers the relevant market, a bid market, and the timing of
the competition, before the sale to the manufacturer.  The M.C. Mfg.
Court explained that there is a “competitive purchaser” requirement
inherent in the “two purchaser” and “competitive injury” elements.
M.C. Mfg., 517 F.2d at 1067; see Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 179;
Toledo Mack, 530 F.3d at 228.  In Feesers’s prior appeal, we embraced
that approach to the competing purchaser requirement by stating that
Sodexo and Feesers compete only if “they are each directly after the
same dollar.”  Feesers, Inc., 498 F.3d at 214 (quoting M.C. Mfg., 517
  Notably, we do not hold that the sales of products by18
the manufacturer to two purchasers must always occur prior to
the competition between the two purchasers.  Our holding is
limited to bid markets that closely resemble the markets in this
case, Volvo Trucks, and Toledo Mack.
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F.2d at 1068 n.20).  We now hold that, simply put, Feesers and Sodexo
cannot compete for the same dollar because their resales of Michaels’s
products to institutions, by their “very nature[, were] mutually
exclusive commitments.”  M.C. Mfg., 517 F.2d at 1067.   The RPA18
does not ordinarily protect competition where “a product subject to
special order is sold through a customer-specific bidding process.”
Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 170 (contrasting such competition with
“competition between different purchasers for resale of [a] purchased
product”).  In other words, the RPA was not meant to cover the type
of competition present in the instant case.
Third, the District Court reasoned that a logical reading of
Toledo Mack limited that decision’s applicability to custom-
manufactured goods.  This conclusion is refuted by the Toledo Mack
Court’s reliance on the M.C. Mfg. decision, Toledo Mack, 530 F.3d at
228 (citing M.C. Mfg., 517 F.2d at 1065 (manufacturing generic
product)), and this Court’s explicit guidance to apply the principles of
M.C. Mfg. to this action.  Feesers, 498 F.3d at 214 (citing M.C. Mfg.,
517 F.3d at 1068 n.20).  Moreover, there is no reason to limit the reach
of the Toledo Mack decision to customized goods because the
underlying principles, pertaining to the timing of the competition and
the nature of the market, remain the same whether applied to generic
goods or customized goods.  This Court’s directive to “narrowly
interpret the oft-questioned RPA” also supports rejection of the
District Court’s view.  Toledo Mack, 530 F.3d at 228 n.17.  A narrow
  For example, in a proposal to the Beth Sholom House19
of Eastern Virginia, Sodexo urged the institution to utilize its
food procurement program to “take full advantage of [Sodexo’s]
kosher vendors.”  Feesers, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 429. The
proposal states that using Sodexo’s kosher vendors would
“streamline the ordering process [and] substantially reduce
pricing” for the institution.  Id.  Kosher food purchasing is an
institution-specific requirement and thus is a customized
offering.  The same would be true for hospitals, which utilize
lengthy RFP processes to confirm that all the special needs of
the hospital are met by the food service management company.
In fact, the foods ordered for any particular institution would
depend on the “size and type of institution” and may include
“bids on a wide range of services.”  Id. at 428.  Sodexo also
enters into profit and loss contracts where “[it] offers a financial
guarantee that the dining services will not lose money, and the
institution shares in a certain percentage of the profits.”  Id. at
442.  
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interpretation, one that limits the applicability of the Act, calls for
taking an expansive view of Toledo Mack’s holding and not limiting
it to customized goods.  See id.  Finally, even if the Toledo Mack
decision was limited to customized goods, Sodexo offers Michaels’s
food products as part of a customized service to customers.  Feesers,
Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 428 (finding that Sodexo sometimes
“determines whether there are any particular problems to be solved [at
an institution]”).   Presumably, problems vary across institutions so19
the proposed solutions for any given institution would be tailored to
that institution’s needs.  In fact, the mere existence of a formal RFP
process shows that institutions require customized contracts to serve
their specific needs.  
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IV.
Having determined that Feesers and Sodexo were not
competitors, three outstanding issues remain.  First, whether this
Court’s holding is barred by the law of the case.  Second, how this
Court’s holding will affect the existing permanent injunction ordered
by the District Court.  Third, the effect of concluding that Feesers
cannot prove a § 2(a) claim against Michaels on the § 2(f) claim
against Sodexo.  We discuss each of the issues in turn.
A.
The “law of the case . . . doctrine posits that when a court
decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the
same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.”  Arizona v.
California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983).  The “doctrine does not restrict
a court’s power but rather governs its exercise of discretion.”  Pub.
Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, 123 F.3d
111, 116 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).  “A court has the power to
revisit prior decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any
circumstance, although as a rule courts should be loathe to do so in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances such as where the initial
decision was clearly erroneous and would make a manifest injustice.”
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816 (1988)
(citing Arizona, 460 U.S. at 618 n.8).
Feesers argues that this Court held, in its prior opinion, that the
evidence of price discrimination in the record was sufficient to apply
an inference of competitive injury.  If this argument were true, it
would be difficult for us now to conclude that Feesers cannot show
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that it was a competing purchaser, as being a competing purchaser is
a prerequisite to the application of the inference.  Feesers’s argument,
however, fails for several reasons.
First, this Court’s prior opinion did not hold as Feesers now
claims.  This Court reversed the District Court’s summary judgment
for the defendants explaining that the District Court used the wrong
standard in concluding that Feesers and Sodexo were not in actual
competition.  Feesers, Inc., 498 F.3d at 208.  In doing so, we noted
that “if substantial price discrimination between competing purchasers
over time is established, then the inference of competitive injury
arises.”  Id. at 216 (emphasis added).  At that early stage of the
litigation, this Court believed only that “Feesers ha[d] proffered
sufficient evidence of competition between itself and Sodex[o] . . .  to
allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude that [they] [we]re in actual
competition.”  Id. (internal quotation omitted).  This Court then
remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Id. at 216.  Nowhere in the prior opinion did this Court hold that
Feesers and Sodexo were competing purchasers or, more generally,
that Feesers had established an inference of competitive injury.  Thus,
the law of the case does not prevent us from holding that Feesers and
Sodexo were not competing purchasers under the RPA.
Second, our present review of this case is conducted with the
benefit of a full record established at trial.  That record was not
available to this Court when we decided Feesers’s appeal from
summary judgment.  We now know that Feesers cannot show that it
and Sodexo were competing purchasers based on the timing of their
competition and the nature of the market—issues that were never
discussed in the prior opinion, presumably, because a complete record
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had not been established.  Finally, even if this Court had previously
held otherwise, our holding in this case would be a permissible
reevaluation of precedent in light of intervening authority, Toledo
Mack.  See Institutional Investors Group v. Avaya, 564 F.3d 242, 276
n.50 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Reich v. D.M. Sabia Co., 90 F.3d 854, 858
(3d Cir. 1996)).
B.
The permanent injunction issued by the District Court states:
“[Michaels] is enjoined from refusing to sell its products to Feesers on
the same terms as they are sold to Sode[x]o, so long as Feesers
otherwise meets its standards as a customer.”  This injunction was
issued under Section 16 of the Clayton Act (1) as a remedy for
contempt and (2) to prevent future competitive injury to Feesers.
Because we are reversing the District Court’s judgment as a matter of
law, neither of its reasons for the injunction survive.  An injunction
issued based on civil contempt cannot stand where the underlying
order on which it is based is invalid.  See Universal Athletic Sales Co.
v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 909-10 (3d Cir. 1975).  Our holding today
renders the need to protect Feesers from further injury non-existent,
because Feesers, as a matter of law, is not a competing purchaser vis-
à-vis Sodexo.
C.
Feesers’s claim against Sodexo arises under § 2(f) of the RPA.
That provision states: “It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce, in the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or
receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section.”
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15 U.S.C. § 13(f).  Because a prima facie case of price discrimination
under § 2(a) of the RPA cannot be established against Michaels,
Sodexo cannot be held liable for inducement.  Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co., 440 U.S. at 76 (“[A] buyer cannot be liable if a prima facie case
could not be established against a seller.”).
V.
Feesers cannot show that it and Sodexo were competing
purchasers, and therefore, cannot show that it suffered competitive
injury under the Robinson-Patman Act.  Accordingly, we will reverse
the District Court’s judgment for Feesers and instruct the District
Court to enter judgment as a matter of law for Michaels and Sodexo.
